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Abstract The paper investigates determinants of pricing in international
telephone service markets. The analysis—focused on 24 worldwide national
markets—shows the impact of several telecommunications-specific and macro-
economic variables on collection rate differentials and traffic imbalance be-
tween countries. An econometric model is aimed at performing quantitative
analysis and providing support to future telecommunications policies.
Keywords Asymmetric competition · International telephony ·
Traffic imbalance
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, the increase of means for international communica-
tions has steadily impacted on the level of prices for fixed telephone services
and the amount of international traffic as well [1, 2]. As shown in Fig. 1 in 2007,
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TDM and VoIP Traffic (billions of minutes)
TDM VoIP
Fig. 1 International Call Volumes 1998–2007. Source: [3]
out of 343 billion minutes of international traffic, 77.7 billion minutes were
carried as voice over IP (VoIP).
As reported by Telegeography [3], in 2007 traditional Time Division Mul-
tiplexed (TDM) experienced an annual growth of 10% while VoIP grew of
about 28%. Growth was particularly slow in Europe and North America.
These are the two regions that generate 75% of the world’s international
traffic. Technological developments (e.g. digitalization of signals) and market
deregulation (i.e. liberalization of access to incumbent’s fixed lines) as well
as changing social and economic behaviours (e.g. growing trade and touristic
flows) have sustained this path [4–6]. There are many consequences of market
liberalization and increased competition [4, 5, 7, 8]: (a) raising competitiveness
made up of flourished and floundered alliances and joint-ventures among
international carriers, high-tech firms and “network based” companies such
as railways and power firms; (b) rapidly growing up of call volumes with high
flexibility in pricing calls; and, (c) a radical change in the way of arranging
bilateral market costs between countries in the long distance sector. As a
consequence, for a long time Eastern European markets (e.g. Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland) have been the “battlefields” where foreign incumbents
and new carriers implemented their aggressive market polices. Incumbents
tried to expand their strategic influence (through alliances and joint ventures)
collecting new customers abroad and compensating for the loss of national
market shares. New service providers progressively expanded their strategic
influence through high-tech and investment-intensive projects increasing mar-
ket shares especially in the long distance sector. They aimed at providing
customers with a plenty of Value Added Services (VAS) and low priced high-
tech solutions. A leading result of such a challenging environment was the
drastic reduction of pricing and the progressive disappearing of asymmetries
between final prices in national and international telephone market. The
possibility of reduced international call tariffs and changing market structure
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in many regions (i.e. Asia, Oceania and Africa) heavily contributed to raise call
volumes. This trend compensated a particular slow growth of matured markets
(e.g. Europe and North America). The radical changes in long distance sector
(e.g. alliances and joint ventures among carriers, introduction of Internet-
based communications solutions as VoIP and raise of call volumes) have
deeply influenced the system carriers fix interconnection prices. As stated by
Alleman et al. [9], companies founded “a reasonable basis for international
telecommunications carrier pricing and settlements in the accounting rate
system” (ARS). According to the ARS, “the two monopoly providers of inter-
national calls, one originating traffic and the other terminating traffic divided
an artificial charge, labelled the accounting rate, one-half of which was the
payment to the party which had a net imbalance of incoming traffic” [10]. More
specifically, the accounting rate was bilaterally determined by negotiations
between public telecommunications operators (PTOs) and it was “normally
divided 50:50; half the accounting rate becomes the fee charged to terminate
an incoming call, and called settlement rate” [10].1 The settlement rate became
a particular method of payment the PTOs applied to the imbalance of calls
between the two carriers [9]. It looked like the best action to allow carriers
compensating each other in case of differing demand levels among originating
and terminating countries [11, 12]. For some years, different authors have been
asking themselves about the reliance of such a system [10, 12–14]. International
telecommunications community has gradually increased its attention towards
the meaning of the ARS. It seems to be no further equitable and appropriate
because of the growing payment imbalances, the increasing international
telecommunications traffic and conflicts between carriers. Moreover, ARS
does definitely not depend on the real costs of termination paid by PTOs in
respective markets and this makes quite reasonable to think that accounting
rate far exceeds the costs [4].2 An intense debate comes from here. Alleman
and Sorce [11] and Kelly [13] argue that long distance sector needs to be deeply
reformed looking to transparency, cost-orientation and non-discrimination.
In the same way, resale and call-back services “stimulate competition in a
1The international accounting rate system—developed in the 1930—was a system to determine
“the division of revenue from international calls between originating, transit and terminating calls”
[7]. For each international call from a country A to a country B, customers charged by the PTO
an amount, named “collection charge”. This was governed by the accounting rate, an “internal
price between PTOs for a jointly-provided service” [15]. To complete a call, PTO B must agree to
carry the call over its network. PTO is reimbursed for the cost of this service by a payment from
PTO A. The payment is determined by the accounting rate; call the rate x. An agreement between
the PTOs will specify that PTO A will pay PTO B an amount αB x per minute of traffic for calls
originating in country A and terminating in country B; for calls in the reverse direction, PTO B
will pay PTO A αA x per minute of traffic (where αA + αB = 1). (In most cases, the fractions
αA and αB are both set to 0.5 i.e. the accounting rate is shared equally between the PTOs). The
amount actually paid to the terminating operator (PTO B, in this case) is known as the settlement
rate. PTO A covers the settlement payment by charging the caller in country A a collection rate
for the total service provided [7].
2It is relevant, in this way, the impact of the technology over the reduction of costs for data & voice
transmission because of its influence over the decreasing of costs of high-tech devices and tariffs.
318 A. Nucciarelli et al.
non-competitive market, forcing the foreign carrier to negotiate a better
settlement rate”. Despite this evidence, technological progress, market lib-
eralization and “the progressive reduction of costs in providing international
services [... have] not be fully reflected in lower prices” [8].
A particular case of transparency violation and cost discrimination verifies
where monopoly-structured and liberalised markets are connected, because
the existence of imbalances for generated traffic has become evident.3 Such
an effect can be mostly cast into the significant divergence of international
telephone prices (collection rates) between carries—operating in liberalized
markets—which continuously perceive collection rates reduction and carriers
which are not induced by the stand-still natural monopoly to perceive effi-
ciency and efficacy in providing services through cost reduction and decreasing
rates. As stated by Madden and Savage [8], “countries that are efficient in
generating outgoing traffic provide high-price countries with an increased
settlement payment”. Thereafter, they argue that rents transfer to monopoly
countries are equivalent to “the difference between the settlement rate (the
originating carrier’s payment to access the foreign country’s network) and
the actual cost incurred by the foreign carrier in terminating the call”. Along
the same direction, Alleman et al. [9] state that “collection rate reductions
by low price countries such as USA have increased their outgoing traffic
relative to incoming traffic, and provided high price countries with increased
settlement payments”. The importance of worldwide asymmetric telecommu-
nications markets relies on a great interest in studying flexible and affordable
instruments for new efficient regulation policies through econometric tools.
This paper, which is an extended version of [16] is aimed at investigating the
impact of different telecommunications-specific and macroeconomic variables
over collection rate differentials and traffic imbalance between countries.4
They are the core variables addressed by National Regulatory Authorities
(NRAs) because of their potential in promoting and increasing telephone traf-
fic.5 While telecommunications-specific variables deal with technology, effi-
ciency and efficacy in providing services as well as price levels, macroeconomic
data consist, for instance, of trade and touristic flows. An econometric model is
developed as an extension of the one proposed by Madden and Savage [8]. This
extended model has the main target of including both telecommunications-
specific and macroeconomic data of 276 couples of countries (processed with
3The opening of telecommunications market has brought to a radical change in the way of
arranging bilateral market costs between countries in the long distance sector [5].
4Collection rates are not linked to traffic deficits.
5This paper does not aim at explicitly investigating the impact of political (and spatial)
directions on telecommunications dynamics. In fact, it focuses on the impact of different
telecommunications-specific and macroeconomic variables on clearly mentioned issues (i.e. collec-
tion rate differentials and traffic imbalance between countries). Accordingly, though the authors
are aware of the relevance of debate as addressed for example in ITU [17], Goodchil and Janelle
[18] and Henisz and Zelner [19], they do not intend to perform a qualitative analysis based on the
measurement of political constraints.
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repetition).6 Indeed, the analysis conducted by Madden and Savage [8] is based
on bilateral markets between the US and 39 foreign countries. The paper by
Madden and Savage examines US international market only analyzing US
incoming and outgoing traffic with foreign countries. This is an asymmetrically
competitive market for international outgoing calls from the US supplied
by n carriers to a foreign country with a monopoly carrier. In this paper
a more exhaustive symmetrical analysis is presented comparing incoming
and outgoing traffic data referred to 24 countries. Thereafter, Madden and
Savage analysis is more incomplete since as market-specific traffic data are
unavailable, country dominant carrier’s share of outgoing traffic is used to
proxy the share of outgoing traffic to US. In the analysis presented in the paper
traffic data are more completed and so this assumption has been removed.
Section 1 presents main features of the extended model and shows its
variables and equations. Sections 2 and 3 display model, results and some
main policy comments. Section 4 provides a comparison between the extended
model and the Madden and Savage’s one in order to show main differences.
Section 5 shows graphs and findings related to the comparison between
countries. Final remarks follow.
2 The model
This section provides an extension of the model by Madden and Savage [8].
Outgoing traffic from each country distributed among n carriers is defined as
qoj and that the total market is Qo = ∑nj=1 qoj. The profit function (πj) of the
carrier j is:
πj = qOjPO (QO, QI, YO, O) − COj
(
qOj, wOj, TechO
) − wrO qOj






PO (Q0, QI, YO, O) is the inverse demand function for outgoing calls;
PO is the collection rate for outgoing calls;
QI is the incoming traffic;
YO is the country’s income;
O is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics that
impact over outgoing call demand;
COj (qOj, w0j, TechO) is carrier j’s outgoing call-handling cost;
wOj is a vector of input prices for carrier j;
TechO is a technology variable;
wrO is the settlement rate paid to the foreign carrier for
terminating outgoing calls;
6Some of the TLC-specific and macroeconomic data are taken from Beardsley et al. [6] and
ITU [20].
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wrI is the settlement rate received for terminating
incoming calls;
qI is QI/n (n is the number of carriers);
CIj (qI, wOj, TechO) is carrier j’s cost of handling incoming calls.
In order to compare the obtained results with those presented by Madden
and Savage [8] we prefer to utilize the same starting propositions. In particular
Eq. 1 assumes that competitors are obliged to accept a uniform settlement rate
(wr = wrO = wrI) and that aside from billing and marketing costs, the costs of
handling outgoing and incoming call should be the same, because transmission
costs do not change with the direction of traffic [11]. In the light of this, the

















) ∗ ∂qI/∂qO (2)
where both MCOj (qOj, wOj, TechO) = ∂COj/∂qOj and MCIj (qIj, wOj, TechO) =
∂CIj/∂qIj indicate in the brackets the strategic behaviour of costs and, more-
over, it enlightens the influence that the carrier j’s output has on the













qOj, wOj, TechO, wr
)
(3)
where marginal cost for carrier j is: [(1+(∂qI/∂qO)) ∗ MCOj (qOj, wOj, TechO)+
(1 − (∂qI/∂qO) ∗ wr]. In the case there is no reversion or reciprocity
((∂qI/∂qOj) = 0), MCSOj equals the cost of handling outgoing calls plus
the wholesale rate. Conversely, when ((∂qI/∂qOj) < 0), the marginal cost of
the call decreases as the cost of handling an incoming meanwhile, it rises
because it is deeply linked to the reduction of incoming call wholesale rate
revenue. Finally, if ((∂qI/∂qOj) > 0), the increase in the cost of handling an
incoming call is offset by increased incoming-call [8] wholesale rate revenue.
Moreover, it is possible to express the supply relation (3) considering that
market conduct influences both price and profitability of carrier j. It is:
PO − τOj ∗ qOj = MCSOj
(
qOj, wOj, TechO, wr
)
(4)
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where τOj = [PO − MCSOj(qOj, wOj, TechO, wr)]/qOj is the ratio of price-cost
mark-up to quantity and measures the degree of oligopolistic competition. The
relationship between outgoing and incoming traffic, dqI/dqOj, presupposes that
carrier j has to consider the strategic conduct of both national and foreign






where MCIO represents an index of concentration of outgoing traffic; Comp
is the measure of competition in both markets and, finally, Priv is the share of
private ownership of carriers operating in the bilateral markets. According to
this, supply relation for the average carrier j is:
PO = MCSOj
(




) ∗ qOj (6)
According to [8], “τO is industry average conduct, and τO = 0 implies no
market power is present. As τO moves away from zero, average carrier conduct
is less competitive”. Flexibility of adopted model allows estimating affordable
empirical data and analysing the reliability of model results. A four equations
system has been implemented in order to achieve an affordable estimation
of the previous equation. More specifically, two of them are related to the
outgoing and incoming supply relations and two of them deal with outgoing
and incoming demand equations. As reported by [8], the log-linear system for




POit = π1 + π2QOit + π3wOit + π4TechOt + π5Dt + π6wrOit







) + εOit (7)
PIit = 1 + 2QIit + 3wIit + 4TechIt + 5Dt + 6wrIit







) + εIit (8)
QOit = α1 + α2POit + α3YOt + α4QIit + α5Tradeit + α6TravOit
+α7Sizeit + υOit (9)
QIit = β1 + β2PIit + β3YIt + β4QOit + β5Tradeit + β6TravIit
+β7Sizeit + υIit (10)
where εOit, εIit, υOit and υIit are disturbance terms.
Before briefly describing empirical results, a Table 1 is presented to sum up
differing variables. It shows both the mean and standard deviation for each
collected variable (years 2003–2006):
The significance of processed variables deals with the need to investigate
both specific aspects of telecommunications worldwide markets and general
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Table 1 Variables description and sample statistics 2003–2006
Variable Definition (measurement units) Mean SD
PO Per minute retail price for outgoing calls (US$) 1.58 1.52
PI Per minute retail price for incoming calls (US$) 1.59 1.51
QO Outgoing traffic volume (millions of minutes) 123.93 330.54
QI Incoming traffic volume (millions of minutes) 125.77 332.87
WO Number of mainlines per employee in outgoing market 52.94 14.65
WI Number of mainlines per employee in incoming market 52.94 14.65
WRO Wholesale rate in outgoing market (US$) 0.20 0.16
WRI Wholesale rate in incoming market (US$) 0.20 0.16
TECHO ICT Development Indexa of outgoing market 5.50 1.01
TECHI ICT Development Index of incoming market 5.50 1.01
D Average distance between countries (kilometres) 5,687.90 4,677.87
MCIO Incumbent’s market share in outgoing market (percentage) 34.98 4.98
MCII Incumbent’s market share in incoming market (percentage) 16.20 2.32
COMP Number of national competitors in outgoing and 10.21 2.82
incoming markets
PRIV Public ownership in telecommunication companies 1.61 0.33
(percentage)
YO Gross Domestic Product (millions of dollars) 8,315.85 260.11
YI Gross Domestic Product (millions of dollars) 8,121.55 190.19
TRAVO Number of travelling tourists from outgoing market 5.78 0.99
(millions)
TRAVI Number of travelling tourists from incoming market 4.45 1.21
(millions)
TRADEO Export from outgoing to incoming market 6,206.98 1,732.11
(millions of dollars)
TRADEI Export from incoming to outgoing market 6,197.34 1,699.21
(millions of dollars)
SIZE Population of outgoing ∗ population of incoming country 1,827.99 3,011.87
aThe “ICT Development Index” has been developed by International Telecommunication
Union [20]
macroeconomic conditions affecting countries. As a consequence, on one
hand, the amount of incoming and outgoing traffic, wholesale rates, per
minute retail prices, number of competitors and degree of privatisation provide
analysts and researchers with useful and suggestive information about the
degree of market competition and concentration, the largeness and attractivity
of the specific market. On the other hand, data as GDP and trade flows strongly
contribute to justify the interest of telecommunications companies in investing
and expanding in worldwide markets. The Information & Communications
Technology (ICT) Development Index (IDI) has been used in this paper as
the technological degree of telecommunication network. This index combines
11 indicators into a single measure that can be used as a benchmarking tool
globally, regionally and at country level. It is related to ICT access (Fixed
telephone lines for 100 inhabitants, mobile cellular telephone subscription per
100 inhabitants, international internet bandwidth per internet user, proportion
of households with a computer and proportion of household with internet
access at home), ICT use (internet users per 100 inhabitants, fixed broadband
internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants and mobile broadband subscribers per
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100 inhabitants) and ICT skills (adult literacy rate, secondary gross enrolment
ratio and tertiary gross enrolment ratio). This index provided by International
Telecommunications Union compares developments in information and com-
munication technologies in 154 countries over a 5-year period from 2002 to
2007.
3 Results
The dataset used is based on annual data for 552 bilateral markets for the
period 2003 through 2006. Of the 24 countries contained in the sample, four
are Asian-Pacific (Australia, Korea, Singapore and Japan), seventeen are
European (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey and UK) and three American (Canada, Mexico e USA).
Although International VoIP traffic grew in the last decade with no sign of
abating (about 35% per year), in our simulation VoIP is not considered for two
reasons: (a) the majority of VoIP traffic is terminated in developing countries
not analyzed in our sample whose telecommunications markets have not fully
or just recently liberalized and where international call termination rates
remain relatively high (b) the aggregation level of switched and VoIP traffic
data are different, VoIP traffic are not available at bilateral level but only at
more aggregated level. The variables are estimated by three stage least squares
(3SLS); R2 values are satisfactory to test the model. All estimated coefficients
denote significance at the 5% level. Three stage least squares estimates are
obtained by first estimating a set of nonlinear (or linear) equations with cross-
equation constraints imposed, but with a diagonal covariance matrix of the
disturbances across equations. This is the constrained two stage least squares
estimator. The parameter estimates thus obtained are used to form a consistent
estimate of the covariance matrix of the disturbances, which is then used as
a weighting matrix when the model is re-estimated to obtain new values of
the parameters. Simulations are run with RATS® econometric software and
correlation analysis shows that variables MCI and COMP are not significantly
correlated. Before showing regression results, two aspects are made clear. First
of all, each variable has a statistically significance in spite of values just strictly
over or below zero. In this way, an extremely low coefficient does not impinge
on the consistency of results because of the relevance of information contained
in its own sign (positive or negative). Secondly, by logical deductions, some
expectations and assumptions about evidences are formulated:
– ∂P/∂Q ≥ 0 implies that an increasing of the supply by carriers brings to a
growing collection rate;
– ∂P/∂w ≤ 0 indicates that international telephone tariffs are expected to
decrease as labour productivity goes arises;
– ∂P/∂Tech is difficult to pre-determine. Indeed, growing efficiency can
reflect into a progressive decreasing of collection rates but, at the same
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time, the better quality of service can induce carriers to modulate tariffs
with sensible increasing;
– ∂P/∂D ≥ 0 deals with the positive relation between distance and collection
rates (a call from the USA to Australia costs, on the average, more than a
call from the USA to Canada);
– ∂P/∂WR ≥ 0 supports the expectation that access to international net-
works deeply affects costs supported by carriers and it reflects the positive
relation with collection rates;
– ∂P/∂(MCI) ≥ 0 reflects, as stated by Madden and Savage [8] that “the
ability of carriers to set collection rates above cost is assumed positively
related to market concentration”;
– ∂P/∂Comp ≤ 0 indicates that there is a negative relation between increased
rivalry in originating and destination markets and the level of collection
rates;
– ∂P/∂Priv ≤ 0 shows a negative relation between the private share in the
equity of carrier and collection rates applied. More specifically, the higher
is the private ownership for the foreign carrier, the lower is the outgoing/
incoming collection rate;
– ∂PO/∂wrO + ∂QI/∂QO = ∂PI/∂wrI + ∂QO/∂QI = 1 implies the restric-
tion that incoming and outgoing transmission cost are equal.
Starting from such expected results and according to results shown in
Table 2, some main comments about the estimation of coefficients in the PO
equation follow.
– The coefficient of WRO is largely positive. The elasticity of final price
depending on the variation of wholesale tariff is positive. Because tariffs
applied to final customers are influenced by the wholesales, by decreasing
the wholesale rate of 30% the final tariff decreases of about 4%;
– The coefficient D is positive but extremely low. Technology has made
distance quite irrelevant in tariff determining. TechO describes the techno-
logical degree of the telecommunication network. The positive coefficient
could be intended as an agreement among companies to improve the
network through tariffs adjustment.
Table 2 The estimation of
coefficients in the PO
equation
Variable 3SLS estimates Dependent variable:
Coefficient Standard error PO
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– The value of Comp indicates that the higher is the number of competing
companies the lower is the level of tariffs. However, a pre-requisite is the
existence of competition in every bilateral market. Accordingly, a bilateral
market with a regulated and a deregulated market attempts to traffic
imbalances and strong divergences in tariffs level.
– Priv indicates the degree of privatization of telecommunications compa-
nies. As in the case of Comp variable, the higher the level of privatization
the lower the level of tariffs.
– The coefficient WO is a measure of company’s efficiency. It is calculated by
fixed lines out of the number of employees. The negative sign means that
the carrier could decrease tariffs by a reduction of costs (e.g. diminishing
the number of employees).
– Finally, MCI is a measure of market concentration. Its positive value
indicates that the more the market is concentrated the higher is the level
of tariffs. As a consequence, a market share reduction of 1% of the market
leader could lead to a decrease of about 0.15% of tariffs.
Main comments and results (Table 3) of the PI equation follow.
– The coefficient of WRI is largely positive. Accordingly, a decrease in
wholesale rate leads to a price reduction. By decreasing the wholesale rate
of 25% the final tariff decreases of about 5%;
– Coefficient D is slightly positive. Because of high-tech features of telecom-
munications network, distance does not affect very much the level of
tariffs.
In this analysis, it is quite insignificant the negative sign of Tech variable. As
already stated, the sign of dP/dTech is always difficult to pre-determine. In fact,
grater technology and digitalization suggest lower collection rates (per minute
retail price) through increased efficiency; however, increased technology and
digitalization may lead to improved service quality and higher prices. In our
simulations percent technology picks up a strong positive coefficient (carriers
raise prices to recover investment costs) in the outgoing equations and a
quite insignificant one for the incoming. The obtained results follow those
obtained by Madden and Savage in the starting model (0.684 and −0.023). This
Table 3 The estimation of
coefficients in the PI equation
Variable 3SLS estimates Dependent variable:
Coefficient Standard error PI
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puzzling result for incoming equation, already reported by Einhorn [1], implies
a percent increase in the technological index leads to a 0.059% weak reduction
in collection rates for incoming calls. The obtained result follows that obtained
by Madden and Savage in the starting model (−0.023).
– Comp variable is negative. In a bilateral market, the final tariff is strongly
influenced by market structure of incoming country. A low concentrated
incoming market corresponds to a general lower level of final prices.
4 A comparison with the Madden and Savage’s model
As shown before, the dataset used is based on annual data for 552 bilateral
markets for the period 2003–2006. On the opposite, the original model by
Madden and Savage referred to about 40 bilateral markets for the period
1991–1994. Such an extension implies the willingness of providing a detailed
and skilled model that could be of a certain importance in telecommunications
policy. Detailed comparisons between models follow:
– the Madden and Savage’s model considers only US bilateral markets
(i.e. USA is always present as a part of the bilateral market). Con-
versely, the extended model is based on bilateral markets of 24 worldwide
countries.
– Madden and Savage’s model investigated telecommunications markets of
the first 1990s. Accordingly, it considered the settlement rate, a tariff
imposed by the carrier of the incoming country to every foreign carrier who
wanted to terminate a call in its country. It was a system mainly based on



















Madden and Savage model Extended model
Fig. 2 A comparison of the estimation of coefficients in the PO equation


















Madden and Savage model Extended model
Fig. 3 A comparison of the estimation of coefficients in the PI equation
model refers to the wholesale rate. It is a tariff that is proper to liberalized
markets.
– The variable Trade has been added to the Madden and Savage’s model.
Thereafter, some variables have been substituted with some more appro-
priate to competition in liberalized markets (e.g. WR). However, compar-
ing similar variables in the both of the models, a couple of graphics can be
drawn (Figs. 2 and 3).
5 Analysis of main countries
Within the analysis of the all 552 bilateral markets, it is possible to investigate
the value of certain variables in differing countries. More specifically, Comp,
Priv, Tech, MCI and WR variables present specific trends in each of the con-
sidered countries. If investigated both Comp and Priv variables in a dispersion
graph, it can be underlined the relationship between coefficients describing
market structure (Fig. 4).
In the bottom left part of the graph, extremely low values of Priv and Comp
variables indicate that UK, USA and Canada are characterized by highly
developed market structures. Early liberalization processes and low market
concentration have led to strong competition. On the opposite, in the upper
right area of the graph, high values of Priv and Comp are for countries with
a slow degree of liberalization. Czech Republic, Mexico and Turkey are some
of the most significant example in this way. Market concentration is still high
and market is now progressively opening to competition. Other countries (e.g.
Italy, Germany and Spain) are great examples of markets where liberalization

























Fig. 4 Comp and Priv in main countries in absolute values
and competition are successfully applied but market maturity is still lower than
that of UK and USA.
6 Final remarks
The paper analyzed determinants of pricing in international telephone service
markets. An extension of the econometric model by Madden and Savage [8]
was used to grasp the impact of different telecommunications-specific and
macroeconomic variables on collection rate differentials and traffic imbalance
between countries. The importance of the approach of the paper relies on
possible telecommunications policy applications. In fact, Priv, Comp, Tech,
D, WR and MCI all contribute to describe market trends and investigate
future competitive developments in the worldwide fixed telephony sector.
Coefficients of variable D assume low values for the scarce significance of
distance. On the opposite, Comp and Priv are great indicators of the state-
of-the-art of liberalization and market openness.
Finally, it has to be underlined that in the analysis of US bilateral markets,
Madden and Savage wished a reform from scratch of interconnection prices
that were one of the main causes of traffic imbalance. However, after liberal-
ization in many countries, USA still presents a prevalence of outgoing traffic.
This is due to wholesale rates. They act as a bottleneck because it decreased
more than the final price. Possible future solutions rely on Internet technology
and its applications (e.g. Voice on Internet Provider).
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